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A Reckoning of Sorts on the Prospects 
of Moral Philosophy 
Joseph Margolis 
I 
Broadly speaking, W estem philosophy has tended to distinguish between the use of our 
cognitive and rational powers in theoretical and practical matters and has persuaded 
itself that, in both, though in different ways, whatever is valid in human judgment 
depends upon and implicates a grasp of certain necessary invariances. The thesis takes 
many forms and has been challenged, with a notable lack of success, from ancient times 
(as in Protagoras) to the tum into the twentieth century (for instance, in Nietzsche), if 
we may measure the success of such opposition by the strength of its immediate 
following. That is largely changed now, in the sense that a furn disjunction between 
theoretical and practical reason is hardly endorsed anywhere, except among chose who 
are antecedently (and unalterably) committed to one or another version of the older 
outlook, and in the sense that there are now many philosophers who regard the denial 
of modal invariance in both world and thought as entirely congenial. 
The history of the older canon divides, in these regards, more or less in terms of the 
themes favored in Aristotle and Kant. (1 mean this, of course, as a heuristic simplifica, 
tion; but it does indeed offer an instructive economy.) Aristotle subordinates practical 
reason to cheorecical reason, because, as he affirms, reality is necessarily invariant; 
because human reason (nous) is capable of grasping its structure directly; and because, 
although practical matters concern what is contingent and changeable, practical reason 
is rightly guided by whatever may be discerned of what is invariant in human nature. This 
is the master theme that binds the Nicomachean Ethics to the Metaphysics. 
If, however, the customs of different societies and differenc ages were judged to be 
merely contingent but (somehow), because of their salience and social density (so to 
say) , normatively binding nevertheless, then, as in the plausible but undefended 
Aristotelian extension of Manha Nussbaum's studies of Henry James and Joseph 
Conrad, the Ethics would soon be judged irrelevant to our own moral world, however 
attractive its analogies might be.1 In any case, in the Ethics, as (more explicitly) in the 
Rhetoric, the rational management of the "accidents," the details, of practical life 
requires that they be judged, perceptually, in accord with what is known to be invariant 
or what may reasonably be so jrudged. Alasdair Maclntyre's Aristotelianism (in After 
Virtue)-an Aristotelianism utterly unlike Nussbaum's--pretends to accommodate the 
play of historically divergent cultures but loses its nerve at the last moment. For, 
although Macintyre ingeniously treats (Aristotelian�like) virtue (or virtues) as {a) 
normative ingredient(s) operative among humans and informed by the telos of the 
central institutions of any viable society, it turns out that wherever the schema cannot 
be fined co modem societies (as is nearly always true), the societies in question are 
summarily judged to be morally defective. In effect, for Macintyre, the internal virtues 
of very different societies prove, miraculously, to be the functional parts of an integrating 
and encompassing virtue that ranges easily and invariantly over every society.2 
The corresponding theme in Kant, which binds the Foundations of the Metaphysics of 
Morals to the first Critique, argues that, in moral matters, the required invariances of 
(practical) reason are autonomously promulgated by way of the same cognizing powers 2
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that originally make possible our grasp of an objective science-but now in a self -
legislating way. The difference between Aristotle and Kant in this regard (the difference 
that seems at first to be in place) is that, unlike Aristotle, Kant supposes that the ruling 
invariances of practical reason cannot depend in any way on actually discerning the 
normative structure of human nature (as if they were the discoveries of some kind of 
theoretical science) ; and that, in the context of science itself, the invariant ordering of 
nature is discernible as such, precisely because it is tacitly imposed. originally and 
corunuctively, by the "thinking subject," on whatever (as we conjecture) comes to us 
through our senses from an unerly alien independent world. 
I take Amt.ode's and Kant's conceptual models as the two principal paradigms of 
Wenem philosophy committed co modal invariance. They are the most ramified, the 
most radical, the most uncompromising, and in a way the strongest models of moral 
theory we have, in spite of local weaknesses. They are also the most influential 
philosophies in the West. I believe they are profoundly mistaken, nonetheless, not only 
in their original voices but in those of the armies chat have foUowed them. 
Let me add, for the sake of a certain balance, that John Rawls 's A Theory of]ustice and 
Jurgen Habermas's "Discourse Ethics" try, by novel and eccentric means, to recover (in 
different ways) the universality and necessity of Kant's morall vision, without Kant's 
"transcendental" resources. Rawls supposes that there is some rational disposition in 
human nature, no matter how it is encultured, ultimately to favor the liberal conception 
of rights and goods that Rawls draws from certain early modem sources he happens to 
favor. The oddity about Rawls's theory is that he neglects to provide an account of 
human nature in accord with which, dialectically,, we may test the range of findings he 
sets before us. For instance, he never considers the possibiliry -· which the entire post· 
Kantian world concedes-- that "human nature" and human "reason" (or"rationaliry") 
may be no more than constructions or artifacts of the historical process. Also, he offers 
no account of the role of history in judging matters of justice and injustice, which are his 
central concerns. On the contrary, the fundamental principles of justice, Rawls thinks, 
are universally favored within the tenns of reference of a postulated "original position" 
in which rational agents have no sense of social history at all, no sense of the actual history 
of any theories of justice and injustice Keyed to the events of practical life.J Justice, it 
seems, is some sort of autonomous intuition. 
But for the great candor and scrupulosity of Rawls's argument, one might, as in 
scanning the views of a lesser and less responsible thinker, easily judge what Rawls has 
to say to be preposterous and arbitrary. I confess I am drawn to such a verdict. In any 
case, the same fault, with minor accommodations, appears in the sequel to A Theory of 
Justice, in Political LibeTalism, which plainly admits its own ideological bent, its inherent 
tendentiousness, though Rawls remains persuaded that the general lines of the theory 
are basically correct.4 
The theory is Kantian au fond, in the plain sense that it depends on the autonomy of 
reason (without a developed account of human nature) and in the sense that its 
deliverances are supposed to be universal and necessary (in some less than apodictic or 
transcendental regard), which it never quite defends. 
For his part, Habennas, who obviously comes under the philosophical influence of 
the stricter Kantian, Karl-Otto Apel,s pretends he can recover, progressively, asymp­
totically, "dialogically," through the relatively "disinterested consensual proce.sses 
of "rational" debate (regarding the import of our, or any, historical situation) , whatever 
corresponds to the universal dicta of Kantian-like practical maxims that pass the test of 
the Categorical Imperative. In fact, according to Habennas, we are led "pragmatically" 
3
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(not apodictically, or a priori, or transcendentally) to rules of reason that are less 
opporrunistic, less egoistic and idiosyncratic, than maxims might otherwise be and 
certainly less vacuous than the Categorical Imperative itself (if taken in the purely formal 
sense Kant recommends) . Habennas supposes that there is something in the structure 
of societal life that remains invariant at the limit of inquiry. whatever history may 
produce. In both Rawls and Habennas, therefore. there is an incipient confession that 
the formal universality and necessity of moral rules are somehow grounded in the 
invariance of human nature; just as, in Nussbaum and Macintyre, the appeal to the 
contingent virtues of historical life somehow lead to invariant norms (if not to rules) by 
which the deviance of actual Life may be descried and corrected. 
I say that these Aristotelian and Kantian strains are standard in Western philosophy, 
both in ethics and in metaphysics and epistemology in general; and that, in different (but 
oddly converging) ways, the two traditions ., down to our own time, where pretensions 
about invariance and competence in discerning invariance are no longer readily 
conceded ·• still dominate philosophy's history. Today, theorists avoid the flat-out 
admission that they have invoked some overriding invariance to save their theory from 
what would otherwise be conceptual disaster. They attempt, as I have been 
suggesting, to find conceptually indirect strategies for recovering the invariances they 
require but know full well they can no longer defend by anything like Aristotle's or Kant's 
devices. Hence the ingenuities ofNussbaum, Macintyre, Rawls, and Habermas ., at least 
in the sphere of ethics. For, if they were discovered to have invoked a particularly 
powerful form of invariance in what might be tactfully called the "executive" way, they 
might also stand accused of replacing philosophy by lazy ideology (which I believe is the 
case) or accused of having proceeded in a question begging way (which I think is also the 
case). 
Occasionally, even in such a virile field as the philosophy of science or the philosophy 
of mind, a strong thinker hesitates in the face of the difficulties I am hinting at and, 
rather than attempt an improbable recovery like th,e recoveries I have mentioned, simply 
falls back (wearily, I imagine) to the reassuring pillow of modal invariance. Thus, for 
instance, Wesley Salmon, worried (it seems) by the Kantian-like restriction Hans 
Reichenbach imposed (with whatever qualificatiion, against Kant) on the supposed 
resources of inductive reason involved in discerning the invariant laws of nature, hurries 
to shore up the general inductive strategy he shares with Reichenbach, by simply 
invoking a convenient version of Aristotle's realist reading of invariance borrowed 
{without ceremony) from the Posterior Analytics.6 In Salmon's view, induction cannot 
discover nomological invariances unless they "are there,. in nature. Quite right! But 
anyone disposed to challenge the moral philosophers mentioned would be bound to 
challenge Salmon as well. We are led thereby to see a surprising linkage between the 
fortunes of moral philosophy and the fortunes of the philosophy of science-and 
metaphysics and epistemology to boot. I shall make more of that later. 
For the moment, let me simply mention, as a second specimen, the recent versions of 
the supervenience theory favored by Donald Davidson and J aegwon Kim (in rather 
different ways) -· the first, in specifically non-nomological terms; the second, in 
nomological terms ,. to the effect that, relative to the mind/body problem, the mental 
"supervenes" on the physical; that is, every change of a mental sort (not otherwise 
specified) must be (cannot possibly fail to be) linked to a corresponding change of a 
physical sort. In Kim, the mental proves to be no more than epiphenomenal; in 
Davidson, the matter is treated agnostically. 7 In neither is the modal necessity of the 
supervenient ever explicitly defended; it is invoked, rather, as a deus ex machina, in 4
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 25 [2015], No. 1, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol25/iss1/3
66 Joseph Margolis 
much the same way Salmon invoices Aristotle. (I freely admit there is a greater show of 
reasonableness in Kim than in Davidson, but I think the case can be fairly made that the 
argument is ultimately circular nonethele�.) 
II 
I have hinted that the fortunes of moral philosophy and the philosophy of science (and 
epistemology and metaphysics) are more clusely linked than philosophers usually 
admit. But the point of saying so is not entirely obvious. Part of what's at stake is that 
the fortunes of epistemology and metaphysics are inseparable from the contingencies of 
practical life .... are affected by those contingencies; and pan lies with our presuming in 
too sanguine a way on modal invariances like thuse Aristotle and Kant have claimed co 
diM:ern. 
There is a short argument that may be mentioned that anticipates --but does noc quite 
deliver ,., everything that may be said against the panisans of modal invariance. Think 
only of this: if Kane is right in construing the "phenomenal world" (the oruy world we 
know) as a construction jointly constituted by the conceptual powers of human 
understanding and "brute" data generated in some unknown way from a noumenal 
world, then Aristotle must be flatly wrong; there is no discerning an invariant structure 
known to inhere in an independent world. But if Kant is right as well in thinking we are 
experientially confined to the "phenomenal world" holistically, then Kant is wrong in 
supposing we could ever discern (within the indissolubly phenomenal) the modalfy 
necessary structures of our own understanding; we should be obliged to study ourselves 
as contingent artifacts within that very construction. 
The importanlt point is this. On such an argument: (i) there would be no principled 
difference between theoretical and practical reason; and (ii) there would be no modal 
invariances to discern, either in science or morality. For my own part, I find the clearest 
anticipation of items (i) and (ii) in Marx's Theses on Feuerbach, but I shall not press the 
case here.8 What is more important is that the general trajectory of the history of 
phil�hy has passed through two critical stages that we ought not ignore: in the first, 
it has challenged the tenability of every effort to construe objectivity (equally in science 
and morality) in tenns of some initial correspondence between how things merely appear 
to us and how they really are "in themselves," independently of our interest and inquiry; 
in the second, it has challenged the tenability of every effort that accepts the constraint 
of the first but reserves to itself some further privilege regarding the self,presenting 
competence of human understanding in its jointly cognitive and constituting role. 
The career of phil�phy in all its inquiries has, I suggest, passed through three 
dialectically linlced phases: fust, favoring correspondence, the assured fit of word and 
world (or thought and reality, or the "subjective" and the "objective") ,, a thesis that 
would not be reasonable unless (as in accord with Aristotle's or Descartes's model) 
reality possessed a necessarily invariant structure and our cognizing powers were natively 
apt for discerning same; second, favoring construction, the insistence that any cognitive 
fit between word and world implicates the tacit role of human understanding in first 
structuring the phenomenal world we are apparently empowered to understand -- a 
thesis that would not be reasonable unless (as in accord with Kant's model) human agents 
coul,d never convincingly claim objective knowledge of a world whose structures were 
entirely independent of the constituting powers of human understanding; and third, 
favoring symbiosis, the admission that any supposed fit between word and world was itself 5
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an artifact of reflexive conjectures upon its own apparent constituting powers, so that {as 
in accord with post-Kantian thought: notably, in accord with Hegel and Marx) there 
could be no prior principled disjunction betwe�n c;ognizing "subjec;ts" and �ognized 
"objects" apt for correcting our objective claims. 
The upshot of this remarkable history, which I have summarized in too brief a way but 
which is all but irresistible, is simply this: objectivity and rationaliry are themselves 
critically postulated artifacts evolving under the evolving forms of reflexive rigor 
afforded by earlier stages of the same artifactual powers. To admit that is to admit that 
all invariance and privilege are gone ·· both in science and morality, and for the same 
reasons. That, I say, is precisely what motivates the cleverness of the late "Aristotelians" 
and .. Kantians" I've mentioned: they are unwilling to go the extra (post-Kantian) mile; 
they are unwilling to concede symbiosis. But they provide no reasonable basis for 
retreating to Aristotle or Kant. You have only to review the doctrines advanced by Rawls 
and Macintyre to see that, in Rawls, no grounds are offered, apart from a pretended 
consensus (that is never tested}, for his very bold claim that rationality (somehow 
deprived of pertinent memory and biography and somehow analyzed in some impossible 
thought-experiment), reliably confirms the lexicographical norms ofliberal justice; and, 
in Macintyre, no evidence is offered, apart from a brave wave of the hand in the direction 
of Aristotelian and Thomist convictions, to show that individual virtue (somehow 
internally linked _, normatively, invariantly, discernibly ·· to collective institutions) 
yields objectively grounded criteria for judging departures from natural morality. 
It is hardly necessary to subscribe to my penny history. Think of it as a dialectical 
challenge ., along several lines: first, with regard to presumed modal invariances; second, 
with regard to the supposed hierarchy of cognitive powers relating theoretical and 
practical matters; and third, with regard to criterially operative notions of "objectivity" 
and "rationality" applied under the conditions of changing history. I put it co you that 
you cannot show that the attack on the "canon" favored by Aristotle or Kant is 
incoherent in any way; hence, that the denial of the supposed modal invariances 
Aristotle or Kant prefer is self-contradictory or paradoxical;  hence, that any return, now, 
to Aristotle or Kant can count on approximating to their legitimative resources. 
Ill 
These are still preambulary remarks. What's needed are the essential arguments 
against Aristotle and Kant. If we had such arguments in hand, the entire direction of 
philosophy would be affected at a stroke •• a f ort:iori, the fate of moral philosophy and 
whatever the inseparability of theory and practice entails (the prospects of the philoso­
phy of science, for instance). I don't mean to say that there are no other options in moral 
philosophy or the philosophy of science besides the Aristotelian and Kantian ones. Of 
course not. Many theorists find the Humean model, for example, quite promising for 
moral philosophy ,. and even for the philosophy of science (though, frankly, the latter 
prospect strikes me as hopeless, given Hume's view of causality, induction, the laws of 
nature, and even physical objects and numerical identity). I still maintain that if 
Aristotle's and Kant's views fail, then the import for both moral philosophy and the 
philosophy of science (as well as epistemology and metaphysics} would be immensely 
more consequential than the defeat of the Humean option. For one thing, there is no 
advocacy, in Hume, of modal necessity in anything like the commanding form the 
doctrine takes in Aristotle and Kant. For another .... which may explain why I cannot 
imagine anyone's seriously invoking Hume in the formation of a systematic account of 6
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the work of the �enc.es ,, Hume's official philosophy i.s noc viable at all; and what LS 
genuinely interesting in Hume is hardly compatible with hi.s official philosophy. I know, 
of course, that many have invoked Hume to good advantage. I can only suppose rhey 
mean to invoke Humean empiricism in name only ,, thac is, in favor of a certain limiting 
view of perceptual con.strainc on theory and Law and explanation and evidentiary 
adequacy and metaphysics and the lilce , �  for instance, as in van Fraassen's recent 
espousal of a spare positivism (opposed, let it be said, to Salmon's view, just in the way 
of manifesting how thinly Hume may be used againsc what is doubtful in the more robust 
"Aristotelian" idiom). 9 
In any case, Hume is a lesser theorist than Aristotle or Kane, though not a lesser 
intelligence, in the plain sense that Hume attempts a remark.able economy ranging over 
all the central concerns of philosophy without ever demonsrrating that his official 
position is viable in even the most relaxed conceptual respect; and that what he means 
to save by means other than whac his srrict empiricism could accommodate he saves by 
a blunderbuss appeal co "associative" habits that are themselves not reconcilable with 
thac empiricism. 
I happen to admire Hume very much, Some say he is philosophy's ironist ## meaning 
by chat, I suppose, something close co what I have just said or, alternatively, meaning 
by chac that claims like Aristotle's and Kane's (avant la leure) may not be philosophically 
defensible. But Hume's own "philosophy" is utterly unworkable ,, if for no other reason 
than that his official view of identity (both numerical and qualitative) makes discourse 
impossible.10 Grant that, and there is nothing to be said for invoking Hume's "philOSO­
phy" as such, Still, that has very little to do with invoicing Hume's splendid observations 
as a civilized commentator on the human scene. On the contrary, Hume is never fatuous 
(as far as I know) in the way Kant often is; but there is (and can be) no sustained 
comparison of their "moral philosophies" or their "philosophies of science," in spite of 
what a tolerant profe.ssion has permitted itself to :say for a very long time. 
The verdict is nowhere dearer than in the space of moral philosophy. For there 
cannot be any point to a moral philosoplry chat lades a viable theory of the human self or 
agent who acts, judges, and takes up responsibilities. Hume's empiricism is completely 
baffled by the need to admit a persisting, relatively unified self ape for forensic 
confrontation (or evidentiary challenge) through time and change. There is no theory of 
the self in Hume that makes arry sense at all. That is precisely why Thomas Reid found ic 
so easy co expose Hume to ridicule; although it is plain that, in speaking of moral matters, 
Hume simply abandoned (as he did, at the very start of his philosophy, in speaking of 
perceptual ideas) any thought of recovering the "self' in strictly empiricist tenns. (Reid 
surely knew that.) 
My point in mentioning Hume is primarily to confirm the reasonableness of confining 
my principal line of argument to countering Aristotle's and Kant's more strenuous 
influence. Nevertheless, in adding Hume so easily to my targets, the promissory note 
intended may be thought to have appreciated in value. le would be very difficult ,, 
certainly in Anglo-American philosophy #, to imagine any triad of figures more 
influential in moral philosophy than those I have now mentioned. The beauty of falling 
back to Aristotle and Kant, apart from challenging their unmatched importance, is that 
what undermines their moral philosophies undermines (for cognate reasons) their 
epistemologies and metaphysics as well. The would#be benefits are too large co be 
ignored. 
Furthermore, once you concede Hume's weakm;ss, it is very hard to suppose that any 
other English#language philosopher could �ibly vie for our allegiance in a new way # 
7
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. equal in imponanc,e to Aristotle's or Kant's- That was part of the reason for mentioning 
Rawls and Habermas and Nussbaum and Macintyre: one needs ro appreciate just how 
dependent contemporary moral philosophy is on Aristotle's and Kant's failed strategies 
.. or, alcematively, on the lesser visions of Hume and Hobbes and Locke and Mill and 
Moore and Dewey chat might be added, without requiring ver,� much in the way of 
adjustment. The same is true, I believe, of continental European thought, with the single 
greac exception of Hegel (and perhaps Nietzsche) , though ic is notonously difficult to say 
what Hegel's theory was or whether Nietzsche haa a theory in anything like the sense in 
which Aristotle and Kant did. I daresay, nevenheless, that no interesting moral 
philosophy (or epistemology or metaphysics, for that matter) can be seriously mounted 
today that fails to come to terms with Hegel and Nietzsche. (Yer they are neglected.) 
More than that, stalemating Aristotle and Kant (along the lines I favor) leads directly 
through the scages of my penny hiscory to a point at which we may reclaim the conceptual 
nerve of both Hegel and Nietzsche. If that is true, there is no need to sketch their 
contributions before a proper ground is laid. Here, I mean only to prepare the way. The 
perception of the serious weakness of Aristotle's and Kant's philosophies is interminably 
deflected by the lengthening labors of academic scholarship; so that now it often comes 
as a surprise co rerrund ourselves of their actual doctrines. The point of making the effort 
is simply that one gains an immense advantage over current philosophy; for, on 
inspection, it turns out that most leading views in moral theory particularly are lictle more 
than pale efforts to recover Aristotle and Kant "by other means.,, 
IV 
The principal intuition against Aristotle and Kant is a natural one: not decisive in its 
mere mention but not negligible either: viz., that if morality (or ethics) concerns the 
normative direction of one's life and one's society's, then the differences between 
Aristotle's and Kant's worlds and our own (and the differences between our own society's 
and another's contemporaneous with ours) must adversely affect our invoking the same 
norms across the immensities of time and place. 
One hesitates to draw that conclusion simply because, elsewhere in our inquiries - ·  
for instance, in theorizing about objective truth in the sciences -- one supposes the 
vagaries of history can be offset. If that is true, one wonders, why should it nor also be 
true in the moral sphere? There you have the due to the importance of testing che 
doctrine of invariance. For if it were finally defeated, one might conjecture, not only 
moral philosophy but the philosophy of science (and epistemology and metaphysics) 
would have to be reworked as well. 
It is possible to attack Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics on many fronts: for instance, by 
insisting that there is no reason to believe the vinues must in principle form a harmonious 
whole ,, whether with one another or with other interests bearing on personal 
development or ranging uniformly over all societies, or that the good life is teleologically 
fitted to human nature on realist grounds. The best short summary of such objections 
that I know appears in Bernard Williams's Ethics and the limits of Philosophy. 1 1  But it 
neglects more strenuous objections, for instance the inevitable weakness of the work of 
all those ingenious interpreters of Aristotle who would recover the preeminence of 
essentialism. I favor an alternative strategy, therefore: one that shows that Aristotle's 
model is suited only locally to the vestige of the Greek world he knew Alexander had 
permanently altered even as he formed his doctrine. On that strategy, we may dismiss 
Aristotle's modal claim ., on which his most fundamental work depends: the Erhics, the 8
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Mnaplrysics, the· Poscerior Anaryao, the De Anima - - and then redeem (if we insist) 
whatever piecemeal insight may be usefully incorporated in an independent doctrine, 
much as we now do with Hume. In a sense, that u what Nussbaum and Macintyre -- and 
Salmon - - do, in their respective ways, except that they believe they are retrieving whac 
is valid in Aristotle's accounr: of invariant nature or human nature. 
Aristotle's master stroke -- I mean the argument on which nearly everything of 
importance in his oeuvre depends -- lies with the idea that if we deny that things have 
invariant natures or essences, we must contradict ourselves somewhere in discourse. By 
that denial, we violate (Aristotle think.s) either the principle of noncontradiction or the 
principle of excluded middle or both_ Well, of course, if Aristotle were right, then we 
had better not tamper with the realist reading ofinvariance. That would offset Williams's 
objections and vindicate to some extent the presumption of a modem .. Aristotelian" like 
Macintyre. Also, it needs to be said, there is no stronger defense {of its kind) than 
Aristotle's: though you may well wonder whether there might be stronger versions of his 
thesis than the one he actually offers. But there cannot be a firmer defense of modal 
invariance than Aristotle's, since {as he says) denial straightway leads to contradiction. 
There are many places where Aristotle advances this thesis. For economy's sake, I 
select the following as being as close co the heart of his claim as. any brief passage is likely 
to be: 
But if not all things are relative (says Aristotle) , but some exist in their 
own right, not everything that appears will be true; for that which 
appears appears co some one; so that he who says all things that appear 
are true, makes all r:hings relative .... make(s) everything relative .... to 
thought and perception, so that nothing either has come to be or will 
be without some one's first thinking so. But if things have come co be 
or will be, evidently not all things will be relative to opinion.12 
'The argument is a complex one. I cannot do full justice to it here. But we need only 
the main thread. It is obviously directed against Protagoras, because Protagoras is said 
to have held: (a) that we may give up invariance and fall bade to changeable appearances; 
and (b) that what appears (to someone) is true (relative to his perception). Aristotle 
says that that means that everything will be both true and false ( 1007b). Bu c the charge 
is misleading as it stands. What Aristotle mearis is that the argument does "away with 
substance and essence": accidents (he says) must be the accidents of something (some 
substance) other than another accident; to construe all predication as holding only of 
appearances leads to contradiction (1007a-b). 
Aristotle's right, of course, if one assumes (in his sense) "substance and essence." But 
why should we? If individual things (ou.siai), now denied invariant natures, were to be 
viewed as artifacts constructed in accord with "the phenomenal world," then there would 
no longer be grounds for the charge of inescapable contradiction. Aristotle's argument 
requires that the principles of noncontradiction and excluded middle be first reconciled, 
as a condition of right application, with his metaphysics of invariance. But there is no 
modal necessity for doing that. 
By parity of reasoning, the law of excluded middle is easily opposed. It is plainly weaker 
in a fonnal sense than the Law of noncontradiction, since its denial is not inherently 
contradictory. It is certainly not modally necessary to adhere to excluded middle. When 
Aristotle says that "a contrary is a privation of substance, th.at contradictories, cannot 
belong to the same thing in the same respect (101 lb), that (speaking of substances) "the 9
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understanding either affirms or denies every object of understanding or reason" ( 10 l 2a) , 
he clearly links excluded middle to the same metaphysics he affums in supporting 
nonconrradiction . But if his metaphysical principle is not necessarily true, then the 
entire argument collapses -- as a modal claim -- though we are at liberty to recycle any 
nonmodal part of Arisrotle1s we may find useful. I should add for the sake of dosure that 
the principle of nonconrradiction is utterly vacuous unless interpreted, in the sense that 
no interpreted application of noncontradiction is modally necessary -- for instance, 
Ariscotle's own dictum. 
Once we accept the falsiry of the modal claim, Aristotle's enlire system ceases to be 
conceptually binding: in moral philosophy, in metaphysics, tin epistemology, in the 
philosophy of science, in logic itself. As a consequence, the Nicomachaen Ethics cannot 
be che necessary model of all valid moral philosophies, and cannot even be shown to be 
valid. It comes as a surprise to see how straightforward the refutation is, and how it can 
be effected without citing a single word from the Ethics itself. 
Let me remind you, however, of the opening line of the Nicomachean Ethics: 
Every art and every inquiry, [says Aristotle) , and similarly every action 
and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the 
good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. 1l 
If this means (as indeed it does) that we must construe the eudamonism of the Echics as 
being in accord with norms internal to the human essence, then, no matter how much 
we suppose practical ethics to be occupied with particular contingencies and accidents, 
the entire undenaking will be tethered in a strong way to invariances said to be 
discovered by some science that knows the nature of man. But if that is no longer possible, 
for reasons drawn from our review of Aristotle's larger conception of reality (within 
whose terms practical matters obtain) 1 then no modem Aristotelian can be said to be 
doing more than drawing weak analogies between the structure of our own historical 
world and the classical world Aristotle limns. On that reading, we have (as yet) no 
demonstrable sense in which the Ethics is rationally or morally compelling. It is 
impressive, I don't deny. But it is only an ideology of sorts ,, in precisely the same sense 
in which Rawls is an attractive idealogue. 
No one will be satisfied with saying only that. But if we find the vision of the ErlUcs 
morally compelling, then the short truth is that we simply find Aristotle's moral taste 
compelling. There's nothing more to say, unless stronger philosophical resources are at 
hand. I say there are none of the modal guage Aristotle presupposes. 
v 
The argument against Kant is both easier and more difficult. It is certainly easier to 
begin with Kant's Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals than with the first Critique; it 
is also obvious that the objective of the Foundations is as opposed to the project of 
Aristotle's Ethics as any such undertaking could possibly be. But Kant's thought is 
notoriously intricate, and we must search for the right clue if we are to challenge his 
doctrine in a way that compares favorably with the argument against Aristotle. But I 
begin autobiographically: I confess I don't recognize in myself a "will" to act in accord 
with duty for duty's sake alone -- in anything like the sense Kant advances. Am I mistaken 
in supposing that such a (pure) "will" is not "present" in me insofar as I am rational? Or 
am l corrupt or irrational in not recognizing that I am still morally bound by its 10
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commands? If the implied objection holds, then (I .say) Kant's doctrine falls. The puzzle 
is how to show tluu such an autobiographical intuiuon cannot be rationally dislodged 
by Kant's arguments in the foundarions. {It is hardly enough to voice a personal 
disclaimer.) 
In the First Section of the Foundanoru, Kant makes the offhand observanon: "It 
should not be thought that what is here required [a metaphysics of morals] is already 
present in the celebrated Wolffs propadeutic to his moral phiJlosophy, i.e., in what he 
calls universal practical philosophy, and that it is not an entirely new field that is to be 
opened. "14 So it is clear that if the modal claim Kant imposes on us depends "entirely" on 
the validity of his new argument (in the Foundarions), I may perhaps be vindicated if that 
argument does not succeed. The incredible thing is that, singlehandedly, Kant seems to 
have invented (by the Foundations) a sense of duty ,, of acting solely from a sense of moral 
obligation, of acting on a priori grounds that bind practical reason categorically, 
"absolutely" ,, that "everyone" supposes must have been "there" in ordinary moral 
experience before he proposed the thesis. (Kane implicitly endorses the trick.) The 
question remains: Does the argument succeed, and how can it be shown co do so? 
I must cite WiJliams's excellent objections once again ,, this time to Kane's proposal. 
Wil[iams draws attention to the fact that what Kant calls "moral laws" are "notional laws," 
that is, chat their force depends on whac Kant conceives to be "che business of making 
(moral) rules."1s He goes on co object that the test Kant prepares for us (conformity with 
the Categorical Imperative) "is not a persuasive rest for what you should reasonably do 
if you are not already concerned [say) with justice [or perhaps with other projects of 
Kant's divising). Unless you are already disposed to take an impanial or moral point of 
view, you will see as highly unreasonable the proposal that the way to decide whac to do 
is to ask what rules you would make if you had none of your actual advantages, or did not 
know what they were. "16 
It seems plain that W illiarns is addressing Rawls, here (or perhaps Alan Gewinh) more 
than Kant, though he claims to be speaking of Kant; for Kant would certainly not admit 
that the force of his argument depended on whether "you were already disposed" to take 
a favorable view of acting from a sense of duty. (This explains the provisional irrelevance 
of my own autobiographical remark.) Nevertheless, it leaves us with the puzzle of just 
how Kant intends to prove his case. 
Williams's objections are very reasonable ,, even telling, in the way in which his 
arguments against Aristotle are telling ,, except that they do not quite engage the 
principal claim. Williams sees what is required, and doubts that what is required can be 
supplied. But he does not go far enough. 17 
In the First Section, Kant offers, by way of the following tally, a first pass at his own 
thesis: 
thus the first proposition of morality is that to have moral worth an 
action must be done from duty. The second proposition is: An action 
performed from duty does not have its moral worth in the purpose 
which i.s to be achieved through it but in the maxims by which it is 
determined .... The third principle is a consequence of the two preced­
ing, I would express as follows: Duty is the necessity of an action 
executed from respect for law.18 
Here, my complaint about the alien quality of Kant's claim may seem at least 
pertinent. For, now, one may ask: What is the sense of "necessity" that Kant invokes? 11
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I don't mean the necessity that follows analytically from embracing Kant's conception of 
moral worth; I mean the nece.ssiry that obliges us to adopt that conception. 
My charge, I can now say, is that I cannot see that Kant successfully establishes that 
we are (uncondicionally) bound lry the necessity he alleges. The failure of his proposal is 
adumbrated in William.s's objections and in my own autobiographical complaint. It's 
dear that Kant's necessity is very different from Aristotle's. Frankly, Aristotle had 
confused the conceptual relationship between logical and metaphysical necessity; 
whereas Kant means to draw our attention to the necessity of admitting the import, for 
moral matters, of "the entirely new field" he introduces. He states this in a frontal way: 
Is it not of the utmost necessity to construct a pure moral 
philosophy, which is completely freed from everything which may be 
only empirical and thus belong to anthropology? That there must be 
such a philosophy is self-·evidenc from the common idea of duty and 
moral laws. Everyone muse admit that a law, if it is to hold morally, 
Le., as a ground of obligation, must imply absolute necessity. 19 
(This catches up the trick of appearing ro analyze a prior intuition among che general 
public, whereas it actually plants its own congenial anticipation among the philosophi­
cally impressionable.) 
The counter argument is deceptively simple: first, it affirms that, considering only 
ordinary views of "duty" (I am not sure in what sense "moral laws" are part o{ the 
"common idea" of morality), the denial of duty's "imply(ing] absolute necessity" is not 
itself self,contradictory or paradoxical; second, it asks Kant to supply the precise sense 
in which, in whatever substantive respect he intends, he can demonstrate that the 
necessity he's introduced is implicated (somehow: noc analytically) by the ordinary view 
of duty or the common idea of morality. I see no demonstration looming, but we are of 
course still at the First Section. It's at the Second that Kant means co spring his argument. 
We must go a little further. 
The nerve of Kant's claim seems to lie in the following: 
From what has been said it is clear chat all moral concepts have their 
seat and origin entirely a priori in reason. 
But since moral laws should hold for every rational being as such, the 
principles must be derived from the universal concept of a rational 
being generally. In chis manner all morals, which need anthropology 
for their application co men, must be completely developed first as 
pure philosophy, i.e., metaphysics, independently of anthropology (a 
thing which is easily done in such distinct fields of knowledge). 
Everything in nature works according to laws. Only a rational being 
has the capacity of acting according to the conception of laws, i.e., 
according to principles. This capacity is will. Since reason is required 
for the derivation of actions from laws. will is nothing else than 
practical reason. 20 
I have deliberately left the capstone of Kant's theory unspecified. The reason is chis: 
the argument implied in what I have just cited is supposed co convey the necessity by 12
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which we infer the categoricaJI force of (that is, the necessiry bmdmg on us by) the "moral 
imperauve" that sausfies the conchcion supulaced. Bue the mmal "metaphysical" 
constraint is supposed to be mdependently necessary: chat LS, IC necessanJy or rauonally 
obliges us to admit the (funher) necessity of the very condition moral obl igation imposes 
on us. There are two forms of necessity here: one i.s the philosophical necessity co accepr 
the categorical necessity of the "moral imperative "; the other is the entailed necessity of 
the "moral imperative" itself. A3 Kant puts ilt: "the imperative of morality" is a 
"categorical imperative," "one which present ls) an action as itself objectively necessary, 
without regard to any other end."21 So we do noc need to consider the details of Kane's 
famous doctrine· of the Categorical Imperative: iI.s validity is a consequence of the 
necessity of the argument just cited. It's the prior argument that fails. 
Consider, for one thing, that it is no< demonstrably necessary chat "everything in 
nature works according ro laws." Causality and nomologicality do not entail one another. 
Van Fraassen, whom I've cited earlier, offers a perfectly cohe rent account of a natural 
world lilce our own, but one th.at lacks laws in the realist sense. Secondly, if the objection 
just supplied were honored, chen, with respect to the second citation (regarding "moral 
laws") , Kant could hardly advance his own claim e·xcept by analytically defining "a rational 
being" as one who acts "according to the conception of laws"; hence, he could never 
claim co have made a meraphysical discovery about moral agents; he could never claim 
to have done that a priori. Thirdly, whatever Kant (thereupon) says about the 
Categorical Imperative ,, which is meanc to bridge our acknowledging ourselves being 
rational beings and our recognizing the necessity the Imperative imposes on us as rational 
beings ,, is nothing but an analytic consequence of his original definition. (It's in chis 
sense that Williams's objection gains a deeper import.) Finally, on the first objection, it 
now proves to be a fatal mistake to suppose that any invariant, a priori, apodictic necessity 
can be compellingly drawn from non-analytic linkages between rationality (or freedom) 
and the universality inherent in the concept of a law. Kant would require a more robust 
metaphysics than he cares to admit. The strategy is a failure. 
Of course, as everyone knows, Kant's account of the Categorical Imperative draws on 
a strong "analogy" to the laws of nature .... hence, to the supposed transcendental findings 
of the first Critique. The laws of nature are said to be universal; hence, the maxims by 
which we act "rationally" must be of the same formal sort (Kant says) as are the laws of 
nature. In fact, Kant explicitly affirms: 
By analogy, then (with the universal laws of nature], the categorical 
imperative of duty can be expressed as follows: Act as though the 
maxim of your action were by your will to become a universal law of 
nature.22 
My verdict is that the modal argument utterly fails, although (as with Aristotle) we 
are entirely within our rights to salvage the Kantian formula (if we wish), though now 
without the presumption (or any ground for same) of the invariance or unconditional 
force of moral reason. The Categorical Imperative (that is, its application in particular 
cases, under maxims) cannot "in the strict sense, command, i.e., present actions as 
practically necessary."23 The rest of Kant's account cannot recover what is needed: it is 
not more than an explication of what Kant supposes is a successful argument. 
Allow me an additional leap, therefore. In the penny history of philosophy I offered 
earlier, I suggested that Kant's constructivism should have led him to accept che doctrine 
of symbiosis -- which of course he implicitly avoids. The reason is clear from the preface 
13
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to the second edition of the fusrt Critique and from Kant's famous letter to Markus Herz 
(February 21 .  1 772). even though the formulation given in che Herz letter was to be 
superseded in the mature form of the Critique itself. The point is thac, in the revised 
preface, Kane acknowledges that, "though we cannot knou1 (any] objects as chings in 
themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to chink them as things in chem.selves; 
ocherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance 
without anything that appears"; and, relative to this already complex matter. Kant adds 
the double thesis that "nothing in a priori knowledge can be ascribed to objects save what 
the thinking subject derives from itself [and] pure reason, as far as the principles of its 
knowledge are concerned, is a quite separate self,subsistent unity, in which, as in an 
organized body, every member exists for every other, and all for the sake of each."24 
The trouble with this reasoning is this. Kant is very clear that the concepts we employ 
c.o give form to what appears as our phenomenal world are not abstracted from "objects" 
experienced; they are innate or prior in "the thinking subject." That is the novelty of 
Kant's 'Copernican revolution": "objects" are co be compared with our native concepts. 
Nevertheless, if we cannot know the "noumena" of which appearances are r.howghc to be 
appearances, then we cannot know what (in the way of intelligible structure) is 
consttucted by che "thinking subject"; and then, we cannot fill in with assurance what, 
precisely, is a priori and what is not in that construction. That is the essential challenge 
of the post-Kantian theme of symbiosis -- and of its historicized nature. 
My shorthand summary of what is illkit in Kant':s account is that Kam has no secure 
source of information about the possible (unsuspected) further fonns of phenomenal 
experience, if (as he admits) he is confined to che phenomenal world itself. Thus, for 
example, he fails co grasp thac there is no necessary conneccion (analytic or synthetic) 
between causality and nomologicaliry. What he ventures to assign to che (prior) 
constructive powers of the "thinking subject" racher than to the (mdissoluble) conscruc# 
tion that is the phenomenal world leads him to think he has discerned the invariant 
structure of that "thinking subject," whereas what he has real[y done is discern che 
contingent regularities (chus far) of what (constructively) he assigns the .. thinking 
subject." According to my penny history, Kant confuses the process of"construction" 
with the product. (That is the point to moving to symbiosis.) To segregate in che 
"constructed" phenomenal world the (prior) work of the "subject" who constitutes that 
world is already to deny that we are confined to the phenomenal world. I have no doubt 
that it catches up the general themes of early modern philosophy, but it also fails to 
protect itself from the valid criticism it draws from a later vantage. 
Read this way, che problematic argument in the Foundations: regarding the a priori 
necessity of rationally endorsing the Categorical Imperative shows the way to exposing 
the more general failure of Kant's strong claims about the a priori conditions under which 
human knowledge is made "possible" at all. The best Kant may suppose is that we may 
conjecture, empirically, about what might be (for all we know) che a priori condition of our 
sciences and other inquiries. But to think that way is to drop the pretense of ever 
discerning the invariant structure of "the thinking subject," and to opt instead for the 
contingencies of symbiosis. Kant implicitly declines che option: it would defeat his 
purpose, to treat the a priori as an artifact of contingent experience itself. Kant is never 
tempted in that direction: "this system [of a priori conditions] will, as I hope [he says). 
maintain, throughout the future, this unchangeableness [its a priority]. "2s On the 
argument, however, that is not a viable option. 
I have now, by somewhat opposing strategies, challenged the claims of modal 
necessity or invariance in Aristotle and Kant, both with respect to the nonnative 14
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questions of morality and (more bnefly) with respect to mowledge and world m general. 
Since I have also shown ## or, perhaps better, sketched a general argument by which 
to show ## that contemporary Aristotelians and Kantians are not likely to recover the 
invariances Aristotle and Kane have favored, the question remains: What are the 
prospects of an objective morality and how are chey related co the conditions of objective 
knowledge in general! There is the puzzle for our rime. The specimen Vlews of the would, 
be Aristocelians and Kantians (I've mentioned) betray the extraordinary fact that we are 
still marking time with irrecoverable strategies. For it is plain enough that those (and 
similar) specimens are among the most admired exemplars of our day. I have brought us 
only to a stalemate. There is perhaps some virtue in having done so, since it forces us to 
admit in a frontal way that we cannot have advanced very far philosophically if we 
continue to favor expended models. One often hears it said nevertheless that we have 
advanced. I fail to see the evidence. We require a distinctly new beginning. If my penny 
history is close co the truth. then it will have co be a very new beginning indeed. 
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